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Empirical analysis of the statutory derivative claim: De facto 
application and the sine quibus non 
This article is an empirical investigation in to how the statutory derivative procedure is 
being applied de facto in comparison with the equitable procedure. Agency theory 
supposes that the corporate purpose is to maximise the value of the company. To do so, 
the “efficient contract” must be approximated between the shareholders and directors, 
which is one that maximises their aggregate welfare. Private enforcement through the 
derivative claim is one such way of doing so. However, an intractable tension exists 
between too much and too little litigation where there are inadequate private incentives 
relative to the corporate purpose. The equitable procedure did not incentivise litigation. 
The concern of the statutory reform was that it would be more accessible creating 
inadequate private incentives for shareholders to litigate. Comparing the de facto 
application of the two procedures we do not find evidence to suggest the statutory 
procedure is more accessible. Instead, we observed what we call the sine quibus non 
for permission. These essential conditions the courts require for permission are unlikely 
to be met by shareholders, creating little incentive to litigate. From this we infer 
directors will continue to be incentivised to deter even beneficial litigation.  
Key words: Derivative Claims; Shareholder Rights; Directors’ Duties; Shareholders; 
Directors 
A. Introduction  
The “normative consensus” of corporate law is that companies should be run for the 
collective interest of shareholders, which is to maximise the value of the company.1 
However where ownership and control are separated, directors may act 
opportunistically against that consensus by shirking responsibility or engaging in 
disloyal transactions.2 This is the agency problem. The goal of agency theory is to 
explain how the disparate interests of directors and shareholders can be aligned to 
achieve the corporate purpose. This is done by approximating the “efficient contract”, 
which is one that minimises the agency costs the shareholders must incur in aligning 
the directors’ interests with their own to maximise their aggregate welfare.3 Private 
enforcement through the derivative claim is one method for achieving this. However, 
an intractable tension exists. A derivative procedure can be efficiency reducing where 
private incentives are inadequate relative to the corporate purpose.4 On one hand, 
incentives to litigate may result in opportunistic and over enforcement to extract private 
benefits for individual shareholders, rather than creating efficiencies. Conversely, a 
lack of incentives can create under enforcement, failing to deter managerial 
opportunism where other mechanisms fall short. 
                                                          
1 It is not the purpose of this paper to criticise this normative consensus and consider different 
theoretical models on organisational theory, and for the sake of this paper such consensus is 
therefore assumed to be correct; but for discussion see, for example, H Hansmann and R 
Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000-2001) 89(2) Georgetown Law 
Journal 439 
2 R Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 1039, 1042 
3 R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (Wolters Kluwer 8th ed, 2011) 17-19; R Kraakman et 
al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP 2nd ed, 
2009) 37; K Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’ (1989) 14(1) 
Academy of Management Review 57; M Jensen and J Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305, 308; R Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386  
4 That is, the derivative procedure is not used in circumstances that would approximate 
efficient agency costs 
The UK reformed its derivative procedure via the Companies Act 2006, Part 11. A 
principal aim was to make it accessible in appropriate circumstances by granting 
discretion to the court.5 Others have considered the effect this reform will have, with 
some fearful that increased accessibility will produce inadequate private incentives for 
shareholders to litigate.6 However, these conclusions are drawn from the law as enacted 
de jure. “One should always aim at measuring the institution as formally specified in 
legislation (de jure) and as factually implemented (de facto).”7 This article statistically 
tests how the statutory procedure is being applied de facto in comparison with the 
procedure in equity:8 That is claims heard in exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle 
and in reference to the Civil Procedure Rules.9  
The basic proposition with our hypotheses is that the equitable procedure was not 
accessible, creating little incentive to litigate. Directors, sensing this lesser incentive, 
could deter derivative claims by rationally exploiting their advantageous position over 
shareholders.10 If we observe the statutory procedure is more accessible than the 
equitable procedure we can infer it will increase private incentives for shareholders to 
litigate. This does not tell us whether those incentives are inefficient relative to the 
                                                          
5 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246) (Cm 3769, 1997), paras 6.8-
6.15; cf. para 6.4 (hereinafter Law Commission Report) 
6 For discussion see, for example, M Siems, 'Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: 
Derivative Actions as a Global Phenomenon', in S Wrbka, S Van Uytsel and M Siems (eds), 
Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests?, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); A Keay and J Loughrey, ‘Derivative 
proceedings in a brave new world for company management and shareholders’ (2010) 3 
Journal of Business Law 151; J Armour et al, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 687, 688-9; A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate 
Governance (OUP, 2007) passim; P Roberts and J Poole, ‘Shareholder remedies – corporate 
wrongs and the derivative action’ (1999) Journal of Business Law 9 
7 S Voigt, ‘How (Not) to measure institutions’ (2013) 9(1) Journal of Institutional Economics 
1, 2 
8 Hereinafter the equitable procedure 9 Foss v Harbottle (1843) Hare 461; Civil Procedure Rules 19.9 
10 L Bebchuk, ‘The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law’ (1989) 89 Columbia 
Law Review 1395 
corporate purpose. Accessibility can indicate how the incentives are biased between the 
relevant actors11 but robust conclusions about approximating efficient agency costs 
cannot be drawn only from how many claims have been brought or are successful.12 
Under the assumption that they are relative to the corporate purpose, by comparing the 
change between the quality and type of claims the two procedures are accessible to we 
aim to draw some inferences about the effect the statutory procedure might have on 
approximating the efficient contract.  
Our findings do not suggest that the statutory procedure is more accessible to 
shareholders. The data identified what we call ‘sine quibus non’ for courts to grant 
permission and high standards to meet these. The inference drawn from these essential 
conditions is that de facto application of the statutory procedure will not create greater 
incentives to litigate than under the equitable procedure. Instead, they might continue 
to incentivise directors to deter litigation because they will rationally seek to exploit 
their advantageous position over shareholders. While other mechanisms can and do 
control managerial opportunism, where they fail the lack of an effective deterrent may 
reduce efficiencies in achieving the corporate purpose. 
 
                                                          
11 J Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for 
private enforcement of law through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law 
Review 668-71, 700-1 
12 M Gelter, ‘Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?’ 
(2012) 37(3) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 844, 881; A Reisberg, ‘Shadows of the 
Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (in)action’ (2009) 6(3) 
European Company and Financial Law Review 219, 229-30; J Coffee, ‘Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for private enforcement of law 
through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law Review 669, 701  
B. Agency Costs 
1. Derivative Suits 
A legal system can reduce the agency problem by making directors accountable to 
shareholders.13 This can be done through mechanisms such as the market, contracts, 
governance mechanisms, and legal liability rules. These do not operate at zero cost but 
mechanisms that incur lower, or more efficient, agency costs are more likely to be 
utilised and survive.14 In certain circumstances a derivative procedure may approximate 
efficient agency costs but it should only be used where lower cost options have failed 
to control managerial opportunism.15 A brief summary can explain this. 
Derivative suits are a high cost solution to the agency problem that can reduce 
efficiencies. Reasons for this are said to include: 1) the cost and difficulty in structuring 
and defining directors’ duties; 2) the threat to an otherwise valuable relationship; 3) 
efficient markets in disciplining managers; 4) rational risk shifting on to shareholders; 
5) less costly methods for ensuring performance; and 6) certain principles of corporate 
law.16 The primary concern of enforcement is that liability can inefficiently shift risk 
on to the directors who would subsequently undertake less risky projects to the 
                                                          
13 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000-2001) 89(2) 
Georgetown Law Journal 439, 441 
14 M Jensen and J Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308; see also, E Fama, 
‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88(2) Journal of Political Economy 
288, 294; H Demsetz, Rationality, Evolution and Acquisitiveness’ (1996) 34(3) Economic 
Enquiry 484, 489; A Alchian, ‘Specificity, Specialization and Coalitions’ (1984) 140(1) 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 34, 47 
15 D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
Law: A theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 261 
16 D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
Law: A theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 261, 286-7; see 
also R Kraakman et al, ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests’ (1994) 82 
Georgetown Law Journal 1733, 1736; and J Coffee, ‘Litigation and Corporate Governance: 
An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (1984) 52 Geo Wash Law Rev 789, 
812-3 – who note other implications of increased liability may include higher remuneration 
for directors in the form of a “risk premium” and higher insurance costs 
detriment of the shareholders.17 It also rarely makes sense for shareholders to second-
guess decisions of directors given the latter’s “superior awareness and understanding 
of complex factors”.18 Because of these high agency costs, company law places limits 
on when shareholders can sue derivatively.19  
Yet, where other mechanisms have failed to align the directors’ interests, the function 
of enforcement is to deter managerial opportunism.20 For example, governance 
mechanisms, including director removal, are designed to align the director’s interests 
with maximising the wealth of the firm but they may only work insofar as the incentive 
to do so outweighs any incentive from acting opportunistically.21 Other legal liability 
rules that can remedy breaches of duty by directors also have their limitations. The 
unfair prejudice petition is a personal remedy that is generally only utilised by small 
                                                          
17 A Skyes, ‘The Economics of Vicarious Liability’ (1984) 93(7) Yale Law Journal 1231, 
1233-9; F&B 270; H Markowitz, ‘Portfolio Selection’ (1952) 7(1) Journal of Finance 77; D 
Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
Law: A theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 261, 270; B 
Black, B Cheffins, and M Klausner, ‘Outside Director Liability’ (2006) 58 Standford Law 
Review 1055, 1059 cf. J Armour and J Gordon, ‘Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value’ 
(2014) 6 Journal of Legal Analysis 35, 39, 50-6 
18 M Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate 
Contractarianism’ (2014) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 11 
19 D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
Law: A theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 261, 265-7; 70; 
see also, K Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’ (1989) 14(1) Academy 
of Management Review 57, 60-2 
20 But deterrence may not always be in the company’s best interests: For a discussion see, for 
example, R Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (OUP 3rd ed, 2017) 42; A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance 
(OUP, 2007) 187-219; R Kraakman et al, ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder 
Interests’ (1994) 82 Georgetown Law Journal 1733, passim; D Schwartz, ‘In Praise of 
Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper of Professors Fischel and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) 
Cornell Law Review 322, 326; J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: 
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 
passim  
21 See, for example, J Armour and J Gordon, ‘Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value’ (2014) 
6 Journal of Legal Analysis 35, 48-9; Z Zhang ‘Legal Deterrence: the foundation of corporate 
governance – evidence from China’ (2007) 15(5) Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 741; D Schwartz, ‘In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper of 
Professors Fischel and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 322, 328, 342; E Fama, 
‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88(2) Journal of Political Economy 
288, 293-4 
private companies.22 Shareholders of smaller companies will be utilising the remedy 
for personal gain, while directors would look to make a fair offer for the petitioner’s 
shares if the benefit from managerial opportunism is greater. The legitimacy of the 
market for corporate control,23 proxy fights,24 and even public enforcement25 are also 
doubted as being individually effective in curbing managerial opportunism. It would be 
unwise to abandon the derivative procedure altogether, as without it directors could act 
with impunity.26 Therefore, some level of derivative enforcement should approximate 
efficient agency costs by deterring opportunistic behaviour.  
2. Incentives 
In litigation the incentives of the actors “may be excessive or insufficient, relative to 
the criterion of maximizing corporate value”.27 On one hand, if too many limits are 
placed on litigation the deterrent function will not survive; but on the other “little will 
                                                          
22 See, for example, The Cohen Report, The report of the committee on company law 
amendment, (1945) Cmd 6659, para 60; Re Astec (BSR) plc [1999] BCC 59, 87; A Reisberg, 
Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) Ch 8; cf. Clark v Cutland [2003] 
EWCA Civ 810 per Arden LJ 
23 See, for example, G Bittlingmayer, ‘The Market for Corporate Control (Including 
Takeovers)’, in B Bouckaert and G De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, 
(University of Ghent and Edward Elgar, 2000) 725-771 
24 See, for example, M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups, (Harvard University Press, 1965) 
25 See, for example, J Armour et al, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical 
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 687, 715-8; J Hay & A Shleifer, ‘Private Enforcement of Public Laws’ (1998) 
88 American Economic Review 398; W Landes & R Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of 
Law’ (1975) 4 Journal of Legal Studies 1; E Dodd, ‘Book Review: Report of the Committee 
on Company Law Amendment’ (1945) 58(8) Harvard Law Review 1258, 1262-4;  
26 R Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 1039, 1043; D Schwartz, ‘In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper 
of Professors Fischel and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 322, 324; D Fischel and 
M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A 
theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 261, 262 
27 R Kraakman et al, ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests’ (1994) 82 
Georgetown Law Journal 1733, 1736 
more discourage” directors if developments deny them the freedom to make business 
decisions.28 
This brings the UK statutory reform into context. If the way the court applies the 
statutory procedure makes it accessible to more claims in comparison to the equitable 
procedure it could increase the private incentives of the shareholders to use [the threat 
of] litigation for their own interests. These private incentives might not be aligned with 
maximising the wealth of the company. This is because shareholders and lawyers do 
not have the best incentives to maximise the wealth of the firm.29  They do not need to 
consider the implications of enforcement on other investors. People do not become 
more selfless as they are given more powers, the opposite may very well be true.30 
Instead of considering the efficiency implications, shareholders may look to utilise an 
accessible procedure to extract a private benefit for their own interests.31 Coffee takes 
the evidence from the introduction of special litigation committees in the US to 
demonstrate this. They were introduced in the US to reduce accessibility to litigation 
from frivolous suits but observed an increase in claims afterwards. The explanation for 
this is it did not consider the incentives of the actors. Since each side pays their own 
costs in the US,32 lawyers could reach a collusive settlement at a lower rate than setting 
up a committee, incentivising litigation.33 Another example is that shareholders will 
                                                          
28 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 287 
29 D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
Law: A theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 261, 271-4 
30 S Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2006) 53(3) UCLA Law 
Review 601 
31 See, for example, W Landes & R Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’ (1975) 4 
Journal of Legal Studies 1, 15 
32 Subject to fee shifting rules, US MCA, § 7.46; Del Code Ann tit 8 General Corporation 
Law, § 109(b), 144; Court of Chancery Rules, Rule 11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2); Del Super. 
Ct. Civ. R. 11(b)(2) 
33 J Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for 
private enforcement of law through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law 
Review 669, 721-3; see also R Romano, ‘The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without 
look for the path of least resistance to advance their private interests. In Germany the 
requirements for establishing derivative liability are vague, creating uncertainty, 
making it considerably difficult for a shareholder to commence a claim. These 
difficulties mean recession suits are far more popular.34 Vermeulen and Zetzche suggest 
that these recession suits were used in preference to other mechanisms because there 
was a private incentive to do so, despite potential inefficiencies.35 Therefore, 
shareholders may use a derivative procedure to extract a private benefit regardless of 
whether it maximises the value of the company where there are inadequate incentives 
to litigate.36 The law should look to incentivise the actors to act in a manner that 
“approximates the … efficient outcome”.37  
  
C. Hypotheses 
Whether the de facto application of the statutory procedure will incentivise 
shareholders to act in a manner that approximates the efficient outcome is the focus of 
                                                          
Foundation? (1991) 7(1) The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organisation 55, 61, 68; J 
Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal 
for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 318 
34 M Gelter, ‘Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?’ 
(2012) 37(3) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 844, 871 
35 E Vermeulen and D Zetzche, ‘The Use and Abuse of Investor Suits’ (2010) 7(1) European 
Company and Financial Law Review 1, 35-36 
36 Many others have recognised this phenomena: J Armour and J Gordon, ‘Systemic Harms 
and Shareholder Value’ (2014) 6 Journal of Legal Analysis 35, 60; M Siems, 'Private 
Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Actions as a Global Phenomenon', in S Wrbka, 
S Van Uytsel and M Siems (eds), Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and 
Reconciling Multilayer Interests?, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 93, 97; B 
Black, B Cheffins, and M Klausner, ‘Outside Director Liability’ (2006) 58 Standford Law 
Review 1055, 1061, 1076; R Kraakman et al, ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder 
Interests’ (1994) 82 Georgetown Law Journal 1733, 1741-3; R Romano, ‘The Shareholder 
Suit: Litigation without Foundation? (1991) 7(1) The Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organisation 55, 57, 65; D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A theoretical and empirical analysis’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell 
Law Review 261, 270 
37 J Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for 
private enforcement of law through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law 
Review 669, 677 
the hypotheses. The statutory procedure should be more accessible than its equitable 
predecessor. The greater access should positively correlate with the value of the 
procedure to shareholders, increasing their incentive to litigate.38 Directors’ incentives 
to deter claims will then be restricted principally because, with English rule on costs, 
as accessibility increases directors are more likely to incur and/or be liable for the 
costs.39 
Greater accessibility alone may only tell us how the incentives are biased between the 
actors.40 Whether greater accessibility in the statutory procedure incentivises claims 
that enhance or hinder company value is not an exact science,41 but this paper considers 
two criteria for drawing inferences about efficiencies. Namely we compare the quality, 
rather than quantity, of claims,42 and the type of claims the two procedures are 
accessible to. 
1. Hypothesis 1: The number of successful derivative claims under the 
statutory procedure is higher and statistically different from the number 
of successful claims under the equitable procedure 
 
2. Hypothesis 2: The number of derivative claims that established a prima 
facie case under the statutory procedure is higher and statistically 
different from the number of claims that established a prima facie case 
under the equitable procedure 
 
                                                          
38 M Gelter, ‘Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?’ 
(2012) 37(3) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 844, 863 
39 Civil Procedure Rules, 44.3(2)(a); see also, A Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the statutory 
scheme for derivative actions under the Companies Act 2006’ (2015) 16(1) Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 39, 57 
40 J Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for 
private enforcement of law through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law 
Review 668-71, 700-1 
41 R Kraakman et al, ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests’ (1994) 82 
Georgetown Law Journal 1733, 1737 
42 A Reisberg, ‘Shadows of the Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies 
Act 2006 (in)action’ (2009) 6(3) European Company and Financial Law Review 219, 229-30 
3. Hypothesis 3: Claims under the statutory procedure will spend less time 
in court than the equitable procedure 
First, we considered if the statutory procedure is more accessible than the equitable 
procedure to increase the incentives of shareholders to litigate. We relied on three 
variables to demonstrate this: establishing a prima facie case; successful claims; and 
time spent in court. Under the equitable procedure shareholders had the burden of 
disclosing a prima facie case. They had to demonstrate sufficient legal merit to a claim 
of fraud on the minority by wrongdoers in control of the company.43 It was uncertain 
what amounted to this making the burden difficult to discharge.44 This, inter alia, meant 
they had little incentive to litigate. The statutory procedure now provides clear grounds 
on who can bring a claim and when.45 A simpler process to bring a claim should 
increase the accessibility and increase the incentive to litigate. For example, where there 
is little risk to the shareholder in submitting an ex parte application, perhaps because 
the individual is well capitalised, and a big risk of having to defend the claim to the 
company, such as loss of business and personal reputation and business resources 
deflected,46 this may incentivise the company to ‘settle’ the dispute at a lower rate than 
defending the claim.47 
                                                          
43 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064 
44 For examples see, Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 
W.L.R. 2, 10-2; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch. 
204; Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Consultation Paper No 142 1996), para 4.14; 
A Keay and J Loughrey, ‘Derivative proceedings in a brave new world for company 
management and shareholders’ (2010) 3 Journal of Business Law 151, 162-5 
45 Companies Act 2006, pt 11; see also Hansard HL Vol 679, Official Report, 27/02/2006, col 
GC14; B Hannigan, Company Law, (2nd edn OUP, 2009) 451 
46 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (OUP, 
2007) Ch 2.2; S Kalss, ‘Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Different Solutions and First 
Steps towards a Possible Harmonisation by Means of A European Model Code’ (2009) 
European Company and Financial Law Review 324, 332 
47 Settling may not be financial but include “therapeutic” remedies that serve the interests of 
the shareholder. See, for example, Mills v Elec Auto-Lite Co, 396 US 375, 392 (1970); 
Fletcher v AJ Industries Inc, 266 Cal App 2d 313, 320 (1968); A Reisberg, Derivative Actions 
and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (OUP, 2007) Ch 5.4.2.3 
That incentive to litigate and to settle should be greater if there is increased likelihood 
that the claim will be successful. The rules in place to access corporate information can 
be ineffective,48 so shareholders often lacked the preliminary knowledge and expertise 
to discover enough information to disclose a prima facie case. Directors who sensed 
this low incentive to litigate “will rationally be inclined to exploit informational and 
positional advantages vis-à-vis shareholders”49 to deter claims. For example, they may 
engage in “dilatory tactics”50 to increase the risk to shareholders of being 
unsuccessful.51 
Even if sufficient legal merit could be demonstrated, there was further disincentive to 
litigate in the equitable procedure. Equitable principles meant the court had to be 
satisfied the claimant was the proper person to bring the litigation. The “proper person” 
test52 prevented relief if the defendant could establish a principle why the claimant was 
not the proper person to bring the claim. If the company had not been improperly 
                                                          
48 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 No 3229, Sch I, Art 50 (Ltd); Sch III, 
Art 83 (plc); Civil Procedure Rules, CPR 31.16; Companies Act 1985, Pt 14; Arrow Trading 
and Investments v Edwardian Group Ltd [2004] EWHC 1319; For discussion see, for 
example, C Paul, ‘Derivative Actions under English and German Corporate Law – 
Shareholder Participation between the Tension Filled Areas of Corporate Governance and 
Malicious Shareholder Interference’ (2010) European Company and Financial Law Review 
81, 111-3; A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation 
(OUP, 2007) Ch 3 para 3.2.3.2; D Latella, ‘Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Comparative 
Analysis and the Implication of the European Shareholders’ (2009) European Company and 
Financial Law Review 307, 322; S Kalss, ‘Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Different 
Solutions and First Steps towards a Possible Harmonisation by Means of A European Model 
Code’ (2009) European Company and Financial Law Review 324, 341 
49 M Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate 
Contractarianism’ (2014) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 19; citing L Bebchuk, ‘The 
Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1395; M 
Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461  
50 J Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for 
private enforcement of law through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law 
Review 669, 690; see also E Dodd, ‘Book Review: Report of the Committee on Company 
Law Amendment’ (1945) 58(8) Harvard Law Review 1258, 1263 
51 For examples of such conduct under the equitable procedure see, Airey v Cordell [2006] 
EWHC 2728 at [15]-[16]; Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373, 389, 396 
52 Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 (Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [72]; citing J Gower, 
Principles of Modern Company Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 652; Barrett v 
Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 367; see also, Nurcombe v Nurcombe [1985] 1 WLR 370, 376 
prevented from enforcing its rights;53 improper motives;54 and the availability of 
adequate alternative remedies55 were all established principles to prevent permission 
being granted.56 Directors only needed to invest in litigation to establish a reason why 
the shareholder was not the proper person to bring the claim. With the company’s assets 
at their disposal, it was unlikely the directors could not establish a single reason to have 
the claim dismissed. These procedural requirements meant shareholders would most 
likely give up rather than commence litigation,57 as shareholders had little incentive to 
commence derivative proceedings because “English rule of fee shifting would deter 
most plaintiffs”.58  
Rather than focusing on procedural requirements,59 the statutory procedure hands 
substantive control over the litigation decision to the court. The court to consider all the 
circumstances of litigation to make its own substantive determination as to what the 
company “actually wants”.60 As Coffee and Schwartz noted “the court must have a 
                                                          
53 Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 368-9; Fargro Ltd v Godfroy [1986] 1 WLR 1134, 2 
BCC 99, 167  
54 Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 367; Smith v Croft (No 1) [1986] 1 W.L.R. 580, 590  
55 Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 367; cited by Konamaneni v Rolls Royce [2002] 1 
WLR 1269, 1279 
56 Other reasons included: Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 (Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [53]; 
Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 93 - whether the conduct is capable of being ratified; Airey v 
Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 (Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [53]; Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 
114; Smith v Croft (No 1) [1986] 1 W.L.R. 580, 590; Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 
373, 404 – independent views; Harley Street Capital Ltd v Tchigirinsky (No.2) [2005] EWHC 
1897 (Ch) at [14]; Nurcombe v Nurcombe [1985] 1 WLR 370, 377; Towers v African Tug Co 
[1904] 1 Ch 558, 562 - if the plaintiff had wasted time or delayed in brining proceedings; 
Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 (Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [72]; Towers v African Tug Co 
[1904] 1 Ch 558, 568 – if the shareholder participated in the wrong complained of; Nurcombe 
v Nurcombe [1985] 1 WLR 370, 378 - whether there were any equitable defences to the 
claim; and Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 – where the company is the proper plaintiff no 
shareholder should be allowed to sue in the absence of wrongdoer control 
57 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 113  
58 J Coffee, ‘Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and 
Charybdis’ (1984) 52 Geo Wash Law Rev 789, 812 
59 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 3 
60 Hansard HL, Vol 679, Official Report, 27/2/2006 Col GC26 
measure of discretion if the deterrent role of the derivative action is to survive”.61 
Otherwise procedural requirements place an unrealistic demand on shareholders, as 
“occasions arise… in which a qualified plaintiff in a meritorious action may be unable 
to meet the verification requirement because of either lack of access to the relevant facts 
or financial naïveté”.62 Discretion enables the court to be alert to the subtler problems 
that face shareholders in derivative litigation, such as lack of expertise, information 
asymmetry, or structural bias.63 Courts can permit claims despite these limitations, 
reducing the shareholders’ burden. Conversely, the burden on directors will be greater. 
“A reviewing court would not accept the weak or disingenuous reasons proffered”64 for 
why permission should not continue. The greater risk to directors will require them to 
invest more in litigation incentivising them to settle, as they will not be able to easily 
fall back on dilatory tactics to expose the shareholders naivety in meeting procedural 
requirements.65 The prima facie case requirements and discretion should lead to an 
increase in successful claims, as predicted in hypotheses 1 and 2, increasing the 
incentive to litigate. 
Discretion will also make the procedure more accessible by making the law more 
predictable and expedient. This will reduce the time spent in court and ultimately the 
cost of derivative claims. The potential liability for costs will act as less of a deterrent 
                                                          
61 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 287 
62 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 315 
63 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 301, 328 
64 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 287; see also, A 
Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 3.4.1.1 
65 See, for example, J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An 
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 
321-6 – on independent views; cf. A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance 
(OUP, 2007) 3.4.1.1-2 
in such circumstances. The law will be more predictable because, unlike the uncertainty 
of fraud on the minority and wrongdoer control, there is an established body of case 
law on directors’ duties and courts will build up a body of subsidiary rules and 
principles to demonstrate when permission is likely to be given.66 Appeals that would 
otherwise increase costs are also unlikely. Appellate courts do not second-guess lower 
courts’ discretion unless the decision proceeded on some erroneous basis or it was 
obviously wrong.67 The procedure will also lower costs through expedience. The court 
will apply its discretion to all the circumstances, rather than needing to be satisfied that 
the legal merits of the claim are sufficient and the claimant is the proper person. 
Hypothesis 3, therefore, predicts less time spent in court under the statutory procedure 
to demonstrate an increased incentive to litigate. 
4. Hypothesis 4: The number of frivolous derivative claims brought under 
the statutory procedure is higher and statistically different from the 
number of frivolous claims under the equitable procedure 
 
5. Hypothesis 5: The number of meritorious claims that are successful 
under the statutory procedure is higher and statistically different from 
the number of meritorious claims that are successful under the equitable 
procedure 
The next two hypotheses consider the quality of claims. By considering what the 
company actually wants, shareholders who bring claims with merit may not be hindered 
by the issues described in the equitable procedure. Claims that would not meet the 
requirements of the equitable procedure may now be able to continue once the court 
reviews the circumstances of why that is so. If the probability of a successful claim is 
higher, most directors will rationally seek to avoid unnecessary litigation expenditure 
                                                          
66 R Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 1039, 1044; cf. A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 
2007) 114-5 
67 Illot v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 at [24]; George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney 
Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803, 816  
and look for cheaper alternatives to resolve the matter.68 From this, we can infer that 
the statutory procedure may produce some efficiencies. The increased risk of successful 
meritorious claims should deter director opportunism or encourage internal 
resolution.69 
However, while costs fall on the loser to deter frivolous litigation,70 greater accessibility 
may initially place the directors at greater risk than the shareholders because the 
statutory procedure rebalances the burden on the actors. Regardless of whether a claim 
lacks merit, circumstances may arise where the shareholder has little to risk while the 
burden on directors might incentivise them to settle for fear of loss of reputation, for 
example. We, therefore, predict that increased incentives in the statutory procedure may 
approximate some inefficiency by incentivising shareholders to bring more claims that 
are frivolous.  
6. Hypothesis 6: Where a discretionary factor is considered by the 
court under the statutory procedure it will significantly relate to 
permission 
The remaining hypotheses look at the type of claims when, with the exception of 
hypothesis 6, compared with the equitable procedure. For hypothesis 6, we would 
expect to disprove the alternative hypothesis and find no relationships between 
individual discretionary factors and permission.  
Under the equitable procedure, a claim would be dismissed if a principle were 
established that demonstrated the shareholder was not the proper person to commence 
                                                          
68 J Coffee, ‘Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The implications of economic theory for 
private enforcement of law through class and derivative actions’ (1986) 86(4) Columbia Law 
Review 669, 699 
69 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 287 
70 See, for example, Report of the Company Law (Jenkins) Committee (1962) Cmd 1749 
litigation. Discretion allows the courts to form an “overall view” of the circumstances.71 
The court will balance the relevant factors to “determine what the company actually 
wants”72 by taking “in to account all the factors set out … and we expect the court to 
consider them together. It would not be a question of taking it step by step in a particular 
order”. Lord Goldsmith continued, “how important each factor is in any particular case 
would … be for the court to determine on the facts of the case, having regard to all the 
circumstances and all the factors that are set out”.73  
By considering all the circumstances we can infer that the statutory procedure should 
approximate efficiencies, as the court is considered best placed to determine whether 
derivative litigation is in the company’s interests.74 For example, the directors may rely 
on independent views to show the claim is not in the company’s best interests.75 Such 
views merit judicial scrutiny because they are subject to structural bias, incomplete 
information, and can be difficult for a shareholder to challenge.76 Likewise, by forming 
an overall view, claims may continue even where there are reasons to dismiss it if, on 
review, it is what the company actually wants.77 
7. Hypothesis 7: The number of derivative claims brought for a fiduciary 
breach is more likely to be successful under the statutory procedure than 
the equitable procedure  
 
                                                          
71 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [29] 
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73 Hansard HL, Vol 679, Official Report, 27/2/2006 Col GC26 
74 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 117; J Coffee and 
D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for 
Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 280-3 
75 Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 368-9; Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114; Fargro 
Ltd v Godfroy [1986] 1 WLR 1134, 2 BCC 99, 167 76 J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 280-4, 301; see also, 
A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 3.4.1.1-3 
77 Which has been the case in the US. See, for example, Meredith v Camp Hill Estates, Inc 77 
A.D.2d 649, 430 NYS.2d 383 (1980); cf. UK position, Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 
367; Smith v Croft (No 1) [1986] 1 W.L.R. 580, 590  
8. Hypothesis 7.1: The number of derivative claims brought for other types 
of conduct than fiduciary breach is higher under the statutory procedure 
and statistically different from the number of claims under the equitable 
procedure 
Next we looked at the type of conduct claims are brought for. Derivative enforcement 
is now available for breach of any of the director’s duties. It is rarely efficient for 
shareholders to bring derivative litigation for matters relating to internal management 
or business judgment.78 If accessibility increases the incentives of shareholders to 
litigate, we predict more claims will be brought for breaches of the duties of care and 
best interests providing evidence of efficiency reducing outcomes arising from the 
statutory procedure. The internal management rule should restrict inefficiency to claims 
brought rather than successfully so. If the claim has no more substance than questioning 
a business decision, shareholders will remain liable for costs and will not be 
incentivised to continue with the claim.  
A more accessible procedure is likely to incentivise claims for a fiduciary breach of 
duty. The costs to shareholders for pursuing fiduciary breaches of duty are lower than 
ones of care, while costs are higher for directors.79 Lawyers too will reserve their efforts 
for these clearer cases where they are more likely to recover their fees.80 The court will 
also stick to what they “do best” by providing judicial oversight of transactions and 
                                                          
78 See, for example, Scottish Insurance Corp v Wilson & Clyde Coal Co 1948 S.C. 360, 377; 
citing Thomas de la Rue & Co (1894) 70 L. T. 870; Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Co 
1947 S.C. 651; Mozley v Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790, 799; 41 ER 833, 837; Carlen v Drury 
(1812) 1 Ves & Bea 154, 157; 35 ER 61, 62; M Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: 
The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism’ (2014) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 11 
79 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223 – strict liability; Ross River Ltd v 
Waveley Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [64], [95]; Psycare Ltd v Mundy [2013] 
EWHC 4573 at [30] – reverse burden of proof; and Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102, 
131; [2000] 2 WLR 1299, 1326 – favourable remedies 
80 D Schwartz, ‘In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper of Professors 
Fischel and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 322, 332 
provide a remedy for the injured.81 They should be willing to allow enforcement of a 
fiduciary breach of duty because they should “always need redress”.82 We would, 
therefore, expect to see an increase in successful claims for fiduciary breaches of duty. 
Such a finding would be indicative of approximating efficiencies. Unless explicitly 
authorised, a rational principal would not negotiate away the protections afforded by 
fiduciary liability.83 The increased prospect of success under the statutory procedure 
should increase the deterrent effect from engaging in managerial opportunism or 
incentivise directors to settle the matter internally. 
9. Hypothesis 8: The number of derivative claims brought by equal 
shareholders is higher under the statutory procedure and statistically 
different from the number of claims under the equitable procedure 
 
10. Hypothesis 8.1: The number of derivative claims brought by equal 
shareholders is more likely to be successful under the statutory 
procedure than the equitable procedure 
These hypotheses look at the type of claimant. Any shareholder can now bring a claim. 
Wrongdoers do not have to be in control of the company. However where the company 
can still make a decision, allowing individual shareholders to litigate in the name of the 
company can reduce efficiencies, as they do not have the best incentive to maximise 
the wealth of the company.84 It is unlikely many claims will involve majority 
shareholders as claimants or instances where a company does still have the ability to 
make a decision itself. Therefore, we look at equal shareholders to draw the relevant 
inferences.  
                                                          
81 D Schwartz, ‘In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper of Professors 
Fischel and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 322, 327-8 
82 D Schwartz, ‘In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper of Professors 
Fischel and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 322, 335 
83 R Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
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84 D Fischel and M Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
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Agency costs from derivative litigation between equal shareholders are high. Sunk costs 
into a valuable relationship of equals may make derivative enforcement inefficient85 
because it would be difficult to maintain an equal relationship where litigation is 
resorted to. In such situations the aggregate welfare of the parties is more likely 
advanced through alternative remedies. The unfair prejudice petition was a lower cost 
alternative under the equitable procedure because it offers a personal remedy for one 
shareholder to exit from the company without standing restrictions.86 
However, derivative litigation may be the efficient cost for equal shareholders to incur 
in certain situations, particularly where the remedy they seek is unavailable through 
alternative means or would produce an inadequate result. Previously equal shareholders 
could have difficulty in establishing wrongdoer control, albeit not impossible.87 If the 
claim is more accessible, equal shareholders will have a greater incentive to pursue 
derivative litigation where the alternative means is not adequate to their interests. It is 
predicted that equal shareholders will bring more claims and successfully so. Much like 
hypothesis 6, the problems that face equal shareholders in showing litigation is in the 
company’s best interests merit judicial review. If the courts are willing to consider all 
the circumstances and permit claims of this type this can evidence efficiency in the 
statutory procedure.  
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86 See Companies Act 2006, pt 30 
87 Mumbray v Lapper [2005] EWHC 1152 
D. Methodology 
The dataset was created using a sample of claims brought under the equitable procedure 
in exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle88 and all England and Wales claims heard 
under the statutory procedure.89 We were looking for those claims regarding whether 
permission should be given to a shareholder to enforce the company’s rights. Claims 
under the equitable procedure were identified using several methods to procure a 
sample. This included searching by keywords in Westlaw. We considered those with 
the topic as ‘companies’ with ‘company law’ or ‘civil procedure’ as the subject. We 
first searched for ‘derivative claims’. We then searched for ‘shareholders’, ‘minority 
shareholders’, ‘directors’ and ‘locus standi’. For these we used the “search within 
results” function by using keywords, ‘derivative’ or ‘Foss’, to reduce the number of 
cases. We also looked at a company law textbook written before the 2006 Act.90 Finally, 
we looked at cases citing three main cases under the equitable procedure.91 From this 
process we identified 44 cases from the equitable procedure. We limited the number of 
claims under the equitable procedure to 30 to avoid a large disparity of claims between 
the two procedures. These were selected at random. However, 3 of the claims selected 
were actions in the shareholder’s own name, which standing restrictions did not apply, 
and were dismissed.92 This left 48 derivative claims, 21 are statutory claims and 27 are 
equitable claims.  
                                                          
88 This means the data includes shareholder litigation on exceptions to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle, as set out in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064 per Jenkins LJ; including 
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90 B Hannigan, Company Law (1st edn, OUP 2003) 
91 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064; 
Foss v Harbottle (1843) Hare 461 
92 Isle of Wight v Tahourdin (1883) 25 Ch D 320; Sweny v Smith (1868-69) LR. 7 Eq. 324; 
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The key variable was ‘procedure’. This variable was coded as binary: 1 represents 
claims brought under the statutory procedure and 0 represents claims brought under the 
equitable procedure. By measuring the change in successful claims between the 
procedures we can infer whether the procedure is more accessible, increasing the 
incentive to litigate. Successful claims were coded as 1 otherwise they were 0. To 
support this we look at increases in claims establishing a prima facie case and a 
reduction in time. Coding for time spent in court was determined by the number of 
hearing dates for each claim. There were 3 missing dates from claims heard under the 
equitable procedure.  
To draw inferences about agency costs we looked at the quality and type of claims any 
increased accessibility would incentivise shareholders to bring. We coded: whether the 
claim was frivolous; individual discretionary factors; the strength of the claim; 
shareholding type; and the conduct complained of. These were all categorical/binary 
variables.  
To draw those inferences we first looked at the change between procedures of the 
quality of claims i.e. whether they were frivolous or meritorious. Previous studies have 
drawn conclusions about the derivative claim by relying on descriptive figures of 
successful claims only.93 Descriptive figures only show how the incentives are biased 
between the actors and not whether there are too few or too many claims. For example, 
a low success rate may not be the result of a lack of access to deter managerial 
opportunism but the derivative procedure incentivising frivolous claims that impose 
                                                          
93 Such as, A Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the statutory scheme for derivative actions 
under the Companies Act 2006’ (2015) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39 
inefficient costs.94 Considering and isolating the quality of claims allows more robust 
conclusions to be drawn about efficiencies. 
No taxonomy exists for quality of claims. What is frivolous or meritorious cannot be a 
term of art because it is claim specific.95 We, therefore, recognise that categorisation 
can be subjective. We have taken the following steps in our methodology to ensure the 
results allow for fair and robust inferences from the quality of claims. 
Our first step was to use comparable objective measures across the two procedures to 
identify frivolous and meritorious claims on the general assumption that those with low 
probability of success could fairly be considered frivolous. A claim was meritorious if 
it was not frivolous.96 Frivolous claims were coded as 1 otherwise they were 0. Given 
the changes between procedures, it was not possible to use identical criteria for both 
procedures. For the equitable procedure, claims were frivolous where either the claim 
was not covered by the conduct complained of or if the court concluded no reasonable 
board would continue the claim. The latter criterion is a relatively low hurdle, justifying 
categorisation as frivolous.97 It required the claimant to demonstrate the claim was not 
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(Ch) the court considered the claim frivolous against some directors but not others. Likewise 
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97 Wallesteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] Q.B. 373, 404; see also, Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 
2728 (Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [67] 
one that no reasonable board would continue.98 For the statutory procedure claims were 
frivolous if there was no prima facie case, the conduct was not covered by the claim, or 
it was dismissed for a mandatory bar. All of these are low thresholds for a claimant to 
overcome. For example, section 263(2)(a) is the same reasonable board test from the 
equitable procedure.99 This categorisation does not include the considerations under 
section 263(3). This is the judicial discretion, where the requirements are higher than 
the mandatory bar thresholds.100  
We measured the quality of meritorious claims in two ways. The first way was to 
exclude frivolous claims from the analysis, measuring only meritorious claims against 
permission to identify any change between the procedures. Looking at the change in 
successful meritorious claims only allows us to infer that the statutory procedure may 
create efficiencies through deterrence or promoting internal resolutions.  
The second way was by developing a scale on meritorious claims to test hypothesis 5. 
Claims with merit may be stronger than others. Those with less merit may incur higher 
agency costs but are still predicted to be more likely to be successful. This is due to the 
increased accessibility under the statutory procedure that enables the court to consider 
all the circumstances, leading to efficiencies described in hypothesis 5. To account for 
this we coded the strength of meritorious claims as strong, middle, and weak based on 
the reasons for and against granting permission. Those with no reasons to dismiss the 
claim were considered ‘strong’, coded as 2; claims with reasons for and against 
dismissal were considered ‘middle’, coded as 1; and ‘weak’ claims were those with no 
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reasons for permission, coded as 0. We only used 3 categories to reduce the analysis 
being biased by how many considerations a court considered in any individual claim.  
To code the strength of meritorious claims, under the equitable procedure this included 
whether there was a prima facie case and any equitable principles considered by the 
court. For the statutory procedure this was based on how many discretionary reasons 
were cited by the court for and against permission. As the equitable principles are 
similar to the discretionary factors, the two procedures were comparable. To code these 
variables we used the list of discretionary factors in section 263(3) and (4) as well as a 
variable on ‘wrongdoer control’ and ‘other’. If the court cited a reason in favour of 
permission it was coded as 1, otherwise it was 0. This required a careful reading of each 
claim to make this determination.  
Our inferences from the quality claims may not be well supported if, for example, the 
coding concludes meritorious claims are those brought for breaches of the duty of care 
that inefficiently shift risk. Looking at the types of claims that are brought between the 
two procedures furthers the robustness of our inferences.  
First, the types of statutory discretionary factors were tested individually against 
permission for hypothesis 6. Disproving the alternative hypothesis will help support the 
claim that discretion promotes efficiencies by allowing the court to consider all the 
circumstances on whether to grant permission, as it should lower the demand on 
shareholders but increase it for directors. 
Second, we captured the type of conduct and the type of shareholder. The latter was 
coded by identifying the share ownership structure between the claimant and defendant. 
For ‘conduct’ the grounds were not directly comparable. Fraud on the minority was not 
always a fiduciary breach of duty.101 We categorised claims brought for breaches as 
directors’ duties based on the duties coded in the Companies Act 2006. ‘Fiduciary 
breach’ for those claims brought under or what would have been brought under section 
175-177; ‘negligence’ for section 174; ‘other breaches of duty’ under sections 171-173; 
and also ‘multiple breaches of duty’. The equitable procedure also consisted of ultra 
vires claims as a final category. Finally, to interpret our findings and support our 
inferences about incentives and efficiencies, they are supported by the judicial dicta. 
All hypothesised relationships except hypothesis 3 were examined by Cross-tabulation 
analysis (or Crosstab). Crosstab is a type of descriptive analysis for examining 
relationships between two or more categorical variables in tabular form. For example, 
we can use Crosstab to determine whether the number of successful derivative claims 
under the statutory procedure is statistically different from the number successful 
claims under the equitable procedure. We used the Chi-Square (Χ2) test in Crosstab 
analysis to determine the extent to which relationships are statistically different. 
Statistical significance was assessed against three levels of probability (i.e., p-values): 
95% confidence level (p-value < .05), 97% confidence level (p-value < .01), and 99% 
confidence level (p-value < .001). If the Chi-Square p-value falls outside any of these 
confidence levels, we can infer no statistically significant relationship or difference 
between variables.  
Hypothesis 3, which considers the assumptions that derivative claims brought under the 
statutory procedure will spend less time in court compared to the equitable procedure, 
was examined by one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). ANOVA was used because 
hypothesis 3 contains a continuous variable (i.e., time) and therefore does not meet the 
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precondition for Crosstab analysis. ANOVA is also a type of descriptive analysis. It 
examines whether the means of two or more continuous variables are significantly 
different across categories of a grouping variable. Statistical significance for the 
ANOVA test was assessed by the same three levels of probability as our Crosstab 
analysis. 
Our preference for the above statistical procedures is justified by at least three factors. 
First, we needed to ensure that any observed differences or relationships between the 
two legal procedures were statistically significant. We used estimates of statistical 
significance (i.e., p-values) from our analytical procedures to ensure our results were 
not simply due to random chance. Secondly, a variety of analytical procedures might 
be useful for establishing statistical significance; however, they tend to be very 
sensitive to sample size. Crosstab and ANOVA tests do not have strict requirements for 
sample size and were therefore considered suitable for our relatively small sample size. 




1. Descriptive Results 
Overall 41.7% (20 out of 48) claims have been successful. 11 out of 27 (40.7%) claims 
were successful under the equitable procedure whereas 9 out of 21 (42.9%) were 
successful under statute. The amount of claims that have demonstrated a prima facie 
case has risen from 55.6% to 100% under statute. Overall the mean time spent in court 
is 3.80 days. Under the equitable procedure it was 5.35 days while the statutory 
procedure claims have a mean of 1.80 days. However, a large standard deviation (8.82) 
for the old procedure suggests the presence of outliers, which was confirmed where two 
claims exceeded 15 days.102 Excluding these from the analysis, the mean reduced to 
3.17 from 24 claims. The maximum time spent in court also decreased from 8 days to 
4. 
Frivolous claims increased from 6 claims (22.2%) to 7 claims (33.3%). Conversely the 
amount of meritorious claims considered strong increased from 40% to 42.9%.  For the 
discretionary factors, Table 2 details the frequency of the discretionary factors 
considered from those claims where the courts have applied their discretion. Several 
claims considered more than one discretionary factor. Table 3 details the frequencies 
for the type of claims. 
Table 1: Discretionary Factors  
Discretionary 
Factor 
Overall Equity Statute 




25 9 17 
Ratified/Authorised 9 2 7 
Company Decision 5 4 2 
Alternative Remedy 19 6 14 
Independent Views 7 4 3 
Wrongdoer Control 5 0 5 
Other 15 7 8 
 









Type of Company    
Public  4 2(1) 2(0) 
Private  36 19(7) 18(9) 
                                                          
102 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204; and Smith v 
Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114  
Other 7 6(3) 1(0) 
Shareholding Type    
Minority/Majority 17 12(7) 6(2) 
Equal 15 5(2) 10(6) 
Majority Claimant 2 1(0) 1(0) 
Dispersed 
Minority103 
9 7(2) 2(1) 
Shareholder/Director 4 2(0) 2(0) 
Conduct Type    
Other 5 3(1) 2(0) 
Fiduciary 32 17(9) 16(9) 
Negligence 2 1(0) 1(0) 
Other breach of duty 0 0(0) 0(0) 
Ultra Vires 3 3(1) 0(0) 
Multiple Claims 4 3(0) 1(0) 
 
2. Statistical Results 
The number of derivative claims that were successful under the statutory procedure is 
not significantly different from those that were successful under the equitable procedure 
(x2 = 0.02, p > 0.05). This indicates that the changes to legal rules between the statutory 
and equitable procedures may not have had a significant influence on whether 
derivative claims were granted permission. Thus, hypothesis 1 was not supported. We 
further examined whether this non-significant relationship remained true when 
frivolous claims were discounted from the analysis, leaving 14 claims under statute and 
21 claims under the equitable procedure. The percentage increase was from 20% to 
64.3% bringing the UK’s success rate in line with other jurisdictions, such as Australia 
and New Zealand where success rates of 61% and 70% have been reported 
respectively.104 The analysis, however, showed no statistically significant difference in 
                                                          
103 Where the claimant and wrongdoer do not collectively own all the allotted shares 
104 A Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the statutory scheme for derivative actions under the 
Companies Act 2006’ (2015) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39, 54; I Ramsay and B 
Saunders, ‘Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An Empirical Study of the Australian 
Statutory Derivative Action’ (2006) 6(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 397, 424 – 
however these analyses considered all claims and did not discount those claims that were 
considered frivolous, so the data is not directly comparable 
the number of successful derivative claims between the statutory and equitable 
procedures (x2 = .486, p > 0.05).  
The number of derivative claims that established a prima facie case under the statutory 
procedure was found to be higher and statistically different from the number of claims 
that established a prima facie case under the equitable procedure (x2 = 11.10, p < 0.001). 
Out of a total of 37 claims that established a prima facie case, 56.8% were brought 
under the statutory procedure and 43.2% under the equitable procedure. All of the 
eleven remaining claims that did not establish a prima facie case were brought under 
the equitable procedure. Thus, hypothesis 2 is fully supported by our analysis.  
Our analysis of whether derivative claims will spend less time in court when brought 
under the statutory procedure than the equitable procedure showed no statistically 
significant relationship (p > 0.05). However, once the outliers (i.e., the two claims 
where time spent in court amounted to 18 and 45 days, respectively) were discounted 
from the analysis, we found a statistical significant relationship (p < 0.05).  
Hypothesis 4 assessed whether the number of frivolous claims is higher under the 
statutory procedure and statistically different from the number of frivolous claims under 
the equitable procedure. Our analysis did not find this to be statistically significant (x2 
= .738, p > 0.05). Out of a total of thirteen frivolous claims in our data, 53.8% were 
brought under the statutory procedure and 46.2% were brought under the equitable 
procedure. This indicates that the tendency for claims to be judged as frivolous was 
slightly greater under the statutory procedure compared to the equitable procedure. 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
The test for hypothesis 5 showed no statistically significant result (x2 = 0.05, p > 0.05). 
The number of meritorious claims that were successful under the statutory procedure is 
not statistically different from the number of meritorious claims that were successful 
under the equitable procedure. However, a further analysis of the data showed that 
derivative claims were in general more likely to be granted permission if they had a 
strong claim (x2 = 44.00, p < 0.001). The 20 (out of 44) meritorious claims that were 
granted permission were all considered to be strong claims (i.e., the claims had no 
reason to be dismissed). From this result we can infer that regardless of differences in 
legal rules between the statutory and equitable procedures, a derivative claim will be 
granted permission if it provides a strong claim but permission will not be granted 
where there is a reason to dismiss it.  
Hypothesis 6 examined whether a derivative claim is likely to be successful under the 
statutory procedure if the court considers a discretionary factor. Three individual 
discretionary factors under the statute are significantly related to a claim being granted 
permission. These were, ‘how much weight a hypothetical director acting in accordance 
with section 172 would attach to the claim’ (x2 = 17.00, p < 0.001); ‘the availability of 
another remedy’ (x2 = 14.00, p < 0.001); and ‘other’ (x2 = 8.00, p < 0.05). The first two 
factors showed a 100% chance of success when one of these factors was considered in 
the claimant’s favour. Further, a perfect relationship was observed with the 
consideration of a hypothetical director and permission. No case has been successful 
without this factor considered in a claimant’s favour. In addition to hypothesis 5 
showing for a court to grant permission there must be no reason to dismiss it, hypothesis 
6 also shows a court must consider that a hypothetical director would attach weight to 
the claim under section 263(3)(b).  
The analysis of our test for hypothesis 7 showed no statistically significant result (x2 = 
0.09, p > 0.05), providing no evidence that the number of derivative claims brought for 
a fiduciary breach will be more successful under the statutory procedure. However, 
upon further examination, our analysis showed that derivative claims were in general 
more likely to be granted permission if they were brought for fiduciary breach (x2 = 
6.52, p < 0.05). For example, a total of 33 out of 47 claims were brought for fiduciary 
breach and 54.5% of these were granted permission. Although the percentage 
difference between successful and unsuccessful claims brought for fiduciary breach is 
quite marginal (9%), our result provides some evidence that changes to legal rules 
between the statutory and equitable procedures may not significantly influence the 
success of any claim brought for a fiduciary breach but such claims are generally 
successful. When we examined the hypothesis that the number of claims brought for 
other types of conduct than fiduciary breach is higher under the statutory procedure and 
statistically different from the equitable procedure, we found no statistically significant 
result (no support for hypothesis 7.1). 
Hypothesis 8, which examined whether the number of claims brought by equal 
shareholders is higher under the statutory procedure and statistically different from the 
equitable procedure, showed a statistically significant result (x2 = 4.66, p < 0.05). 
However, the test for whether the number of claims brought by equal shareholders is 
more likely to be successful under the statutory procedure than the equitable procedure 
(hypothesis 8.1) found no statistically significant result. We interpret these results to 
suggest that the likelihood for granting permission to claims brought by equal 
shareholders may not necessarily be dependent on differences in legal rules between 
the statutory and equitable procedures. 
 
F. Analysis of Incentives and Agency Costs 
There is little to suggest that the statutory procedure is more accessible to increase the 
incentives of shareholders to litigate. While there appears to be greater predictability of 
when a claim will succeed, a reduction in time spent in court and an increase in claims 
establishing a prima facie case, we do not observe claims being more successful, neither 
generally, for meritorious claims, or for fiduciary breaches of duty. One might interpret 
these findings differently. The statutory procedure may be increasing the incentive to 
use the threat of litigation internally without the dispute ever reaching the court, 
therefore not resulting in an increase in observed litigation. We would reject such an 
interpretation. This is because our findings suggest that, instead of considering all the 
circumstances, there appears to be sine quibus non for the courts to grant permission. 
These require that the claim has sufficient legal merit and there is no reason to dismiss 
it, reminiscent of the equitable procedure. Shareholders will face difficulties in meeting 
the standards required of those conditions creating little incentive to litigate, as they are 
likely to be liable for costs. Directors sensing this will continually be able to deter 
litigation by exploiting their position. This will be particularly true in claims not 
previously caught by the equitable procedure. The inference drawn is that where other 
mechanisms have failed to control managerial opportunism, directors could reduce 
efficiencies by deterring enforcement. 
1. Sine Quibus Non: The hypothetical director 
Consider the first condition for permission as an explanation for why there will not be 
an increase in the incentive to litigate and how it could reduce efficiencies. The court 
must be satisfied that a hypothetical director would attach weight to the claim. Rather 
than being satisfied of a procedural requirement that there was sufficient legal merit,105 
discretion can overcome the subtler problems shareholders face to determine what the 
company actually wants. 
However, the court appears to continue to view litigation as a matter of business 
judgment; something that they consider themselves ill equipped to make except in a 
“clear case”.106 Instead courts have assessed whether a director would attach weight to 
the claim by considering its legal merits.107 For example, in Franbar the assessment 
under section 263(3)(b) proceeded on the legal merits that “there is sufficient material 
for the hypothetical director to conclude that the conduct of Medicentres’ business by 
those in control of it had given rise to actionable breaches of duty”108 but could not yet 
be said to amount to “breaches of duty which ought to be pursued”.109  Judicial 
discretion introduces a condition that the claim’s legal merits meet a threshold for 
permission through the back door.110  
To satisfy this condition for permission under section 263(3)(b) it is not enough that 
the claim relates to a breach of duty and the legal merits are not so weak that no director 
                                                          
105 Law Commission Report, paras 6.4, 6.71-3; see also, Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 
(Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [29]; Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [33]; Kleanthous 
v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch); (2011) 108(36) LSG 19 at [40]  
106 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch); [2010] BCC 420 at [85] – what a 
clear case is was not expanded upon but might included situations such as Stimpson v 
Southern Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch); [2010] BCC 387; see also D 
Schwartz, ‘In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary of the Paper of Professors Fischel 
and Bradley’ (1986) 71(2) Cornell Law Review 322, 325, 327-8 
107 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch); [2010] BCC 420 at [85]-[88] 
108 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [30] 
109 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [37] 
110 For other examples of courts considering the legal merits under section 263(3)(b) see, for 
example, Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch); [2010] BCC 420 at [85] – 
refusing to consider commercial matters; Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] 
BCC 134 at [29]-[48] – stating the court will consider a “range of factors” but focused their 
decision on the possible unlawfulness of the loan 
would continue the claim.111 They must go further by showing the legal merits disclose 
a director would also attach weight to the claim: 
Section 263(2)(a) will apply only where the court is satisfied that no director acting in 
accordance with section 172 would seek to continue the claim. If some directors 
would, and others would not, seek to continue the claim the case is one for the 
application of section 236(3)(b).112 
What amounts to sufficient merit to satisfy the court that a hypothetical director would 
attach weight to the claim appears to be considerable. In Franbar, one of the complaints 
was for a breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants had attempted to divert opportunities 
to another company.113 Strict liability should have meant the defences offered would 
not alleviate a breach of fiduciary duty. Another complaint about the diversion of 
patients to another company would be a clear breach of fiduciary duty, even if the new 
company would offer a different type of medical services.114 Further, the court 
conceded that the directors were likely to blame for the conduct complained of.115 Yet, 
while the court was satisfied that a reasonable board would pursue the allegations, 
satisfying section 263(2)(a), the claims were not yet in a form that disclosed “obvious 
breaches of duty”116 that were worth pursuit and the claim was dismissed. In another 
claim it was said more than an “arguable case” was needed to satisfy the condition.117  
The assessment of section 263(3)(b) in successful claims also reflects this high 
standard. In Stainer, despite obiter statements that claims with weak legal merit could 
                                                          
111 Which are the standards under Companies Act 2006, ss 261 and 263 respectively 
112 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch); [2010] BCC 420 at [86] 
113 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [11]-[12] 
114 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [13] 
115 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at at [30] 
116 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [37] 
117 Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch); [2010] BCC 387 at 
[34]; see also Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 at [19] 
still be successful,118 the claim was said to be “well arguable”119 where there was a 
“clear conflict of interest”.120  In Hughes v Weiss, despite the court saying there was no 
merits test121 the claim had “good prospects”122 and a “strong case”.123 Parry v Bartlett 
was said to be a case that would have been successful under the equitable procedure.124 
The merits of one successful claim were described as “so powerful” and “so sufficiently 
substantiated” permission should be granted.125  
The inference drawn from this is de facto application of the statutory procedure is it 
will create little incentive for shareholders to pursue derivative litigation because they 
have the burden of proof.126 Meeting this high standard will be difficult due to 
information asymmetry. Unless the shareholder has actively monitored the company or 
has the relevant expertise, they may well be ignorant of what happened. A lack of 
preliminary knowledge may make applications for pre-action disclosure “close to a 
fishing expedition, which the courts … will be very slow to admit”.127 Shareholders 
also have to pay the cost of pre-action disclosures, meaning the absence of preliminary 
knowledge creates a big risk to shareholders in attempting to pursue derivative 
litigation, as there is no guarantee they will find sufficient evidence. In Bridge, for 
example, the shareholder had substantial difficulties in compiling evidence to 
substantiate his claim of market manipulation, which were dismissed since various 
                                                          
118 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [29]; see also Hughes v Weiss 
[2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [33] 
119 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [42], [46] 
120 Stainer at [42] 
121 Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [33] 
122 Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [34] 
123 Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [37]-[38] 
124 Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) at [81] 
125 SDI Retail Services Ltd v King [2017] EWHC 737 at [68]-[75] 
126 See, Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 249; Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 
(Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [59], [73] 
127 C Paul, ‘Derivative Actions under English and German Corporate Law – Shareholder 
Participation between the Tension Filled Areas of Corporate Governance and Malicious 
Shareholder Interference’ (2010) European Company and Financial Law Review 81, 112-3 
factors can affect share valuation in a publicly listed company and a fall in share price 
did not mean the company had suffered a loss.128  
Directors will continue to have a greater incentive to deter litigation. Knowing that a 
shareholder will be liable for costs if they cannot demonstrate sufficient legal merit to 
their claim, they may exploit their advantageous position. There is evidence of this in 
the claims. In Franbar, the claim could not be substantiated to the standard required 
under section 263(3)(b), partially due to the directors withholding financial 
information.129 In Stainer, Mr Lee made several spurious submissions to try and defeat 
the claim. For example, claiming it had been agreed monies were to be lent interest free 
in the offer document when they had not130 and refusing to discuss company accounts 
with individual shareholders.131 In Kiani, the directors withheld information despite 
having six weeks to produce it.132 While the latter two of these three claims were 
permitted,133 they may have been Pyrrhic victories. In Stainer a cap was applied to the 
indemnity,134 while Kiani only achieved permission down to disclosure and was not 
granted an indemnity,135 leaving shareholders at risk of additional monetary and 
nonmonetary costs. 
While the courts will evidently not accept disingenuous reasons from directors about 
the merits of the claim, the directors are able to put costs onto the shareholders to deter 
                                                          
128 Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 at [40]-[45] 
129 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [15], [22] 
130 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [10]-[11]  
131 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [13] 
132 Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch); [2010] BCC 463 at [30]; for another example of 
deterrent tactics by directors see, SRI Retail Services Ltd v King [2017] EWHC 737 (Ch) 
(CHD) at [29]-[33] 
133 Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch); [2010] BCC 463 at [30] – information withheld; 
Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [46] – authorisation for a 
transaction obtained illegitimately  
134 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [56] 
135 Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch); [2010] BCC 463 at [46]-[49]; see also DPM 
Property Services Ltd v Kiani [2012] EWHC 2056 (TCC) 
even beneficial litigation by creating some doubt about the claim’s prospects. This 
creates the prospect of inefficiencies manifesting where other mechanisms fail and 
litigation would otherwise be in the company’s best interests.  
2. Sine Quibus Non: Discretion and the proper person 
Suppose a shareholder can demonstrate sufficient merit to their claim. The second 
condition requires there to be no reason to dismiss the claim. The court still appears to 
be guided by the proper person test and its principles. Roth J acknowledged that 
“permission … is a discretion resting in the court”,136 and “the discretion must, of 
course, be exercised in accordance with established principles”.137  
Given the range of established principles under the proper person test, it seems unlikely 
controllers, with the company’s assets at their disposal, would be unable to come up 
with a reason to have the claim dismissed.138 Faced with the range of principles that 
can have a claim dismissed, de facto application suggests a shareholder will have little 
incentive to litigate under the statutory procedure.   
Take two principles – independent views and adequate alternative remedies – as 
examples of how they can reduce the incentive to litigate.139 The first principle is that 
the extant derivative claim is utilised in the absence of an adequate alternative 
remedy.140  
                                                          
136 Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder [2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) at [21]; [2012] BCC 797  
137 Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder [2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) at [14]; [2012] BCC 797  
138 Echoing A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 113 
sentiments that a shareholder, faced with this prospect, might as well give up 
139 Other examples include Re Singh Brothers Contractors (North West) Ltd [2013] EWHC 
2138 at [44]; see also Rex v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [1917] 1 KB 486, 505; 
cited by Smith v Croft (No 1) [1986] 1 W.L.R. 580, 590 – principle of uberrima fides from the 
claimant; and Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder [2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) at [21]; [2012] BCC 
797 – wrongdoer control. This was “not a case where the company cannot or will not enforce 
its rights”; Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] BCC 885 at [39]-
[48] – ratification  
140 Barrett v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243, 367 
It is the availability of an alternative remedy which may have some significance in the 
light of what I am about to say. … If the court … is satisfied that such a proposal 
affords adequate protection for the claimant, he should not, in my judgment, be 
allowed to proceed with his derivative claim.141 
Regardless of what the company may actually want, if an adequate alternative remedy 
is available permission will be refused. Once it is appreciated that an adequate 
alternative will frequently be available to shareholders it will limit the utility of the 
derivative claim in deterring managerial opportunism. 
An alternative remedy will frequently be available because the unfair prejudice petition 
covers most complaints also caught by a derivative claim.142 This has become more so 
as the scope of the petition has expanded over the years.143 It will also be adequate in 
most circumstances. An adequate alternative is more than the theoretical availability of 
one.144 The court considers the subjective intentions of the claimant in what they hope 
to achieve and then objectively assess whether there are alternate means that can 
adequately address the complaint.145 For example, the courts considered the subjective 
intentions of the claimants in Kleanthous and Stainer who were and were “not seeking 
to be brought out”146 respectively. The courts then objectively assess the adequate way 
to remedy the claim. In Kleanthous, the court agreed that the unfair prejudice petition 
                                                          
141 Airey v Cordell [2006] EWHC 2728 (Ch); [2007] BCC 785 at [74], [77] 
142 See, for example, O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, HL; [1999] 2 BCLC 1; Grace v 
Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70; Re Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd (No 3) [1995] 1 BCLC 636; 
cf. Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 All ER 354 
143 The remedy was introduced under the Companies Act 1985, s 459; replaced by Companies 
Act 2006, s 994; between 1948-1985 there was the oppression remedy see, Companies Act 
1948, s 210; Companies Act 1980, s 75; for the restrictive approach see, for example, Re a 
Company [1983] Ch 178 
144 Mumbray v Lapper [2005] EWHC 1152 at [5] 
145 See, for example, Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [66] 
146 Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch); (2011) 108(36) LSG 19 at [80]-[81]; 
Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [52]; see also, Parry v Bartlett 
[2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) at [88] 
was more appropriate since sums recovered from a derivative claim would be returned 
to the shareholders, 85% of which were owned by the defendant directors.147  
The application of this principle may reduce efficiencies because regardless of whether 
the claim’s merit may enhance corporate value, it will often be in the interests of both 
actors to pursue the alternative remedy. Shareholders are likely to prefer the petition 
and complaints can frequently be resolved through this route.148 Likewise, directors 
may go undeterred if they can make a fair offer to purchase the claimant’s shares at a 
lower rate than the benefits that accrue from the opportunism.  
Now consider the principle of independent views. If independent views, either those of 
directors or shareholders, conclude litigation was not in the best interests of the 
company then litigation had been properly prevented and the claimant is not the proper 
person to act for the company.149 Short of actual bias or illegitimacy,150 a court will not 
challenge the substance of that independent decision.151 There is, of course, good 
reason for respecting these views. The majority of independent shareholders are best 
placed to maximise the wealth of the company, while independent directors will be 
better informed of the merits of any litigation.152  
However, an unwillingness to challenge the independent view in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances will not create greater incentive to litigate leaving the risk 
                                                          
147 Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch); (2011) 108(36) LSG 19 at [77]; see also, 
Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch) at [83]; Phillips v Fryer [2012] EWHC 1611 (Ch); 
Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2008] EWHC 1534; [2008] BCC 885 at [37], [54] 148 cf. Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) at [88] – where there shares were worthless; 
for discussion see, A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) 
Ch 8 
149 Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114, 185 
150 See, for example, Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch); (2011) 108(36) LSG 19 
at [75]; Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [46] 
151 Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 at [56]; Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 
(Ch); (2011) 108(36) LSG 19 at [75], [83] 
152 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) Ch 3.4.1.1 
of managerial opportunism going undeterred. Independent views are likely to support 
dismissal, as the US example of special litigation committees shows,153 even though 
litigation may be beneficial. Psychological and sociological factors mean independent 
directors are likely to rally around their own,154 while collective action problems mean 
independent shareholders are unlikely to support the action155 or will favour other 
action, such as “therapeutic” remedies or director removal.156 Likewise, claimant 
shareholders will have difficulty challenging independent views157 and the independent 
views may be solicited after the claimant has incurred costs.158 This creates a significant 
risk for the shareholder. They may commence a claim and incur costs only for the 
directors to solicit independent views to have it dismissed. 
A court is “impotent when faced with [these] subtler problems of structural bias that 
inhere in a corporate structure”.159 Therefore, managerial opportunism may go 
undeterred as long as independent views can be solicited regardless of other 
circumstances. As Kleanthous demonstrates, the courts have continually followed this 
principal, even going as far as refusing to agree with the submission that “seriously 
abusive behaviour” should defeat a genuine belief by independent members or directors 
                                                          
153 J Cox, ‘Searching For the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of 
Zapata and the ALI Project’ (1982) 6 Duke Law Journal 959, 963 
154 L Bebchuk and J Fried, Pay Without Performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive 
compensation (Harvard University Press, 2006) 31-4; J Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival 
of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 
Columbia Law Review 261, 283; M Klein, ‘Conduct of Directors When Litigation is 
Commenced Against Management’ (1976) 31(2) Business Lawyer 1355, 1359; R Buxbaum, 
‘Conflicts of Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative 
Statutes’ (1980) 68(6) California Law Review 1122 
155 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) Ch 3.2.3.4 
156 Mills v Elec Auto-Lite Co, 396 US 375, 392 (1970); Fletcher v AJ Industries Inc, 266 Cal 
App 2d 313, 320 (1968)  
157 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) Ch 3.4.1.1-3 
158 Companies Act 2006, ss 261-4 
159 A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2007) Ch 3.4.1.2; J 
Coffee and D Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal 
for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 301 
that enforcement was not an appropriate course of action.160 This was despite Mr 
Paphitis selecting the independent views from two selected business associates. Both 
were directors of the defendant company, though not at the time the conduct took place. 
One was previously an employee while the other had been a director of several 
companies associated with Mr Paphitis. The judge did not wish to challenge their 
determination, holding that they had received “legal advice on their duties”161 and were 
therefore “better placed … to assess where the companies' commercial interests lie”.162  
Principles in derivative litigation continue to be biased towards directors. They need 
not invest more in litigation under the statutory procedure to have a claim dismissed. 
The court will continue to dismiss claims falling foul of a single principle rather than 
assessing what the company actually wants. The adherence to these principles means 
managerial opportunism may continue to go undeterred where other mechanisms fail, 
creating the risk of inefficiencies arising in the statutory procedure. 
3. Sine Quibus Non: Claims on wider grounds 
Claims brought for different types of conduct, such as mala fides or negligence, and by 
different types of shareholders, such as equal shareholders, can produce inefficient 
agency costs, but they may have some positive effect in limited circumstances. 
However, the sine quibus non mean such claims are even less likely to be successful 
than those that would have been caught by the equitable procedure.  
The condition of sufficient legal merit means claims for other breaches of duty will 
struggle to, to use the words in Franbar, demonstrate an “obvious breach of duty”. The 
non-interventionist imperative of the court means they will not second-guess 
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commercial decisions taken in good faith.163 A claimant would need to show the 
director has been negligent or acted in bad faith. To do so, they would either have to 
show the director did not believe what they were doing was in the best interests of the 
company164 or had not provided proper oversight of the company’s affairs.165 The 
information asymmetries in derivative litigation will mean shareholders will struggle 
to demonstrate sufficient legal merit to their claim to discharge this burden.  
Even if sufficient merit could be established it less likely than claims for fiduciary 
breach of duty that the controllers would be unable to come up with a reason to dismiss 
the claim. Independent views, for example, would be unlikely to conclude that pursuing 
claims for negligence or bad faith would be worthwhile. In the one claim brought for 
negligence under the statutory procedure, none of the independent shareholders 
canvassed supported the claim.166  
The conditions also demonstrate why other types of shareholders have not been more 
successful. We suggest the primary reason for this is the court’s attitude to the existing 
principles of wrongdoer control and the availability of an adequate alternative remedy. 
While the claimant need not show wrongdoer control as a prima facie requirement, the 
courts still apply the proper plaintiff principle.167 Roth J noted “a claim that lies in a 
company can be pursued only by the company”.168 An absence of wrongdoer control 
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means the company may not be deprived of its rights of enforcement.169 Therefore, 
shareholders outside the scope of the equitable procedure will still be prevented from 
accessing permission, so there will be little incentive to pursue it.  
The significance of an adequate alternative remedy should also restrict claims brought 
by equal shareholders. A cordial business relationship is unlikely to be restored when 
it has resorted to legal proceedings. Objectively, the adequate way to resolve such 
disputes is for one party to exit the company under section 994, and it is well established 
that shareholders can do so for fiduciary breaches of duty170 as well as care.171 While 
several claims between equal shareholders have been successful under the statutory 
procedure these claims would have been successful under the equitable procedure. They 
have tended to involve relationships or companies that had ended anyway172 sometimes 
making the shares worthless.173 In such situations the unfair prejudice petition would 
be inadequate, as a share purchase would be of no value, and where the relationship is 
ended the court does not have to be concerned about the likely effect on a continuing 
relationship. 
While such claims may generally reduce efficiencies, they can have some benefit. The 
sine quibius non mean there is little incentive to utilise derivative litigation in these 
wider circumstances. This may create some inefficiency in those rare circumstances 
where such claims would otherwise enhance corporate value. 
                                                          
169 Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder [2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) at [21]; [2012] BCC 797; see 
also Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch) at [55]-[57], [68]; cf. Stainer v Lee [2010] 
EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [16], [49] 
170 See, for example, Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70; Re Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd 
(No 3) [1995] 1 BCLC 636 
171 Oak Investment Partners XII v Boughtwood [2010] 2 BCLC 459; Re Macro (Ipswich) 
[1994] 2 BCLC 354  
172 Hughes v Weiss [2012] EWHC 2363 (Ch) at [4] – company dissolved; Parry v Bartlett 
[2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) – company to be wound up 
173 Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) at [88] 
 G. Conclusions 
The conclusions from this analysis should not be overstated. Other mechanisms can 
and do control managerial opportunism in the majority of companies. The point is that 
without an effective backstop, in those instances where directors do decide to act 
opportunistically, the sine quibus non for permission could minimise the deterrent 
function of derivative litigation.  
The data demonstrates the way the courts are applying the statutory procedure in 
comparison with the equitable procedure is unlikely to increase the incentives of 
shareholders to use litigation once the sine quibus non are accounted for. They show 
the incentives in litigation are likely to be continually biased in favour of directors. 
Directors are unlikely to settle a complaint and they will exploit their advantageous 
position to deter litigation. A rational shareholder is unlikely to look to commence 
litigation and they will seek cheaper alternatives to remedy their complaint. The 
inference we draw from de facto application is that inefficiencies may arise from 
managerial opportunism going undeterred where other mechanisms fail to control it.  
Widening the scope of the claim is unlikely to resolve this issue, as the court’s 
“engrained traditions do not disappear overnight; rather, they persist in ways that have 
low visibility.”174 A practical solution may be to look to reduce information asymmetry 
to enable the litigant shareholder to meet the high standard set by the court in meeting 
the requirement of sufficient legal merit.175 This is unlikely to lead to opportunistic or 
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over enforcement as the conditions for permission will still restrict such claims from 
being successful and liability for costs will deter claims. However, those desirable 
claims, particularly for fiduciary breaches of duty, can continue in appropriate 
circumstances. Without further consideration a director will continue to have a strong 
incentive to deter litigation that could otherwise control their opportunism to maximise 
the value of the company.  
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